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ABSTRACT
The area of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning has
been enriched during the past two decades with the addition
of Argument-Based Reasoning Systems. Defeat between
arguments is established by a combination of two basic ele-
ments: a conflict or defeat relation, and a preference relation
on the arguments involved in this conflict. The research ac-
tivities are centered in our abstract framework for argumen-
tation, where two kinds of defeat are present, depending on
the outcome of the preference relation. This framework also
takes subarguments into account, leading to the formaliza-
tion of well formed argumentation lines.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, abstract argu-
mentation, dialogues.
1 INTRODUCTION
The area of Knowledge Representation and Reason-
ing has been enriched during the past two decades
with the addition of Argument-Based Reasoning Sys-
tems [10, 12, 5, 8, 15, 2] to mention a few. The
study of the acceptability of arguments is one of the
main concerns in Argumentation Theory. In formal
systems of defeasible argumentation, arguments for
and against a proposition are produced and evalu-
ated to test the acceptability of that proposition fol-
lowing a dialectical process [13]. The main idea in
these systems is that a proposition will be accepted
as true if there exists an argument that supports it,
and this argument is acceptable according to an anal-
ysis between it and its counterarguments. This anal-
ysis requires a process of comparison of conflicting
arguments in order to decide which one is prefer-
able [12, 11, 1]. After this dialectical analysis is per-
formed over the set of arguments in the system, some
of them will be acceptable, justified or warranted ar-
guments, while others will be not. Argumentation is
used as a form of non-monotonic or defeasible rea-
soning [9] and it is suitable for modeling dialogues
between intelligent agents.
Abstract argumentation systems [5, 15, 7] are for-
malisms for argumentation where some components
remain unspecified. Usually, the actual structure of
an argument is abstracted away. In this kind of sys-
tem, the emphasis is put on the semantic notion of
finding the set of accepted arguments. Most of them
are based on the single abstract concept of the attack
represented as an abstract relation, and extensions are
defined as sets of possibly accepted arguments. The
task of comparing arguments to establish a preference
is not always successful. However, finding a preferred
argument is essential to determine a defeat relation.
2 ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORK
Our argumentation framework is formed by four ele-
ments: a set of arguments, a binary conflict relation
over this set, a subargument relation and a function
used to decide which argument is preferred given any
pair of arguments.
Definition 1 An abstract argumentation framework
Φ is a quartet 〈Args,v,C,R〉, where Args is a fi-
nite set of arguments, v is the subargument relation,
C is a symmetric and anti-reflexive binary conflict re-
lation between arguments, C ⊆ Args × Args, and
R : Args×Args −→ 2Args is a preference function
among arguments.
Here, arguments are abstract entities [5] that will be
denoted using calligraphic uppercase letters. No ref-
erence to the underlying logic is needed since we are
abstracting the structure of the arguments. The sym-
bol v denotes subargument relation: A v B means
“A is a subargument of B”. Any argument A is con-
sidered a superargument and a subargument of itself.
Any subargument B v A such that B 6= A is said
to be a non-trivial subargument. Non-trivial subargu-
ment relation is denoted by symbol <. The follow-
ing notation will be also used: given an argument A
then A− will represent a subargument of A, and A+
will represent a superargument of A. When no confu-
sion may arise, subscript index will be used for distin-
guishing different subarguments or superarguments of
A.
The conflict relation between two arguments A and
B denotes the fact that these arguments cannot be
accepted simultaneously since they contradict each
other. For example, two arguments A and B that sup-
port complementary conclusions l and ¬l cannot be
accepted together. The set of all pairs of arguments
in conflict on Φ is denoted by C. Given a set of ar-
guments S, an argument A ∈ S is said to be in con-
flict in S if there is an argument B ∈ S such that
(A,B) ∈ C. The set Conf (A) is the set of all argu-
ments X ∈ Args in conflict with A.
Conflict relations have to be propagated to super-
arguments, that is, if an argument A is in conflict
with an argument B then (A,X) ∈ C para todo X
tal que A v X. The constraints imposed by the con-
flict relation lead to several sets of possible accepted
arguments. For example, if Args = {A,B} and
(A,B) ∈ C, then {A} is a set of possible accepted
arguments, and so is {B}. Therefore, some way of
deciding among all the possible outcomes must be de-
vised. In order to accomplish this task, the relation R
is introduced in the framework and it will be used to
evaluate arguments, modelling a preference criterion
based on a measure of strength.
Definition 2 Given a set of arguments Args, an ar-
gument comparison criterion R is a binary relation
on Args. If ARB but not BRA then A is preferred
to B, denoted A  B. If ARB and BRA then A
and B are arguments with equal relative preference,
denoted A ≡ B. If neither ARB or BRA then A
and B are incomparable arguments, denoted A ./ B.
As the comparison criterion is treated abstractly,
we do not assume any property of R. Any concrete
framework may establish rationality requirements for
decision making.
Example 1 Φ = 〈Args,v,C,R〉 is an argumen-
tation framework where Args = {A, B, C,D,E},
C = {{A,B}, {B,C}, {C,D}} and A  B,B ./ C,
A  E and C ≡ D.
For two arguments A and B in Args, such that the
pair (A,B) belongs to C, according to definition 2
there are four possible outcomes:
• A  B. In this case a defeat relation is estab-
lished. Because A is preferred to B, in order
to accept B it is necessary to analyze the accep-
tance of A, but not the other way around. It is
said that argument A defeats argument B, and A
is a proper defeater of B.
• B  A. In a similar way, argument B defeats
argument A, and thereforeB is a proper defeater
of A.
• A ≡ B. Both arguments are equivalent, i. e.
there is no relative difference of conclusive
force, soA andB are said to be indistinguishable
regarding the preference relation R. No proper
defeat relation can be established between these
arguments.
• A ./ B. Both arguments are incomparable ac-
cording to R, and no proper defeat relation is
inferred.
In the first two cases, a concrete preference is made
between two arguments, and therefore a defeat rela-
tion is established. The preferred arguments are called
proper defeaters. In the last two cases, no prefer-
ence is made, either because both arguments are in-
distinguishable from each other or because they are
incomparable. These cases are slightly different. If
the arguments are indistinguishable, then according to
R they have the same relative conclusive force. For
example, if the preference criterion establishes that
smaller1 arguments are preferred, then two arguments
of the same size are indistinguishable. On the other
hand, if the arguments are incomparable then R is
not able to establish a relative difference of conclu-
sive force. For example, if the preference criterion
states that argument A is preferred to B whenever the
premises ofA are included in the premises of B, then
arguments with disjoint sets of premises are incom-
parable. This situation seems to expose a limitation
of R, but must be understood as a natural behaviour.
Some arguments just can not be compared.
Some authors leave the preference criteria unspec-
ified, even when it is one of the most important com-
ponents in the system. However, in many cases it is
sufficient to establish a set of properties that the cri-
teria must exhibit. A very reasonable one states that
an argument is as strong as its weakest subargument
[15]. We will assume from now on that this property
is present in the criterionR included in Φ. This is im-
portant because any argument A defeated by another
argument B should also be defeated by another argu-
ment B+.
When two conflictive arguments are indistinguish-
able or incomparable, the conflict between these two
1In general, the size of an argument may be defined on struc-
tural properties of arguments, as the number of logical rules used
to derive the conclusion or the number of propositions involved in
that process.
arguments remains unresolved. Due to this situation
and to the fact that the conflict relation is a symmetric
relation, each of the arguments is blocking the other
one and it is said that both of them are blocking de-
featers [10, 14]. An argument B is said to be a de-
feater of an argument A if B is a blocking or a proper
defeater of A. In example 1, in the context of argu-
mentation framework Φ3, argument A is a proper de-
feater of argument B, while C is a blocking defeater
of D and vice versa,D is a blocking defeater of C.
Abstract frameworks can be depicted as graphs,
with different types of arcs. We use the arc ( • )
to denote the subargument relation. An arrow
( // ) is used to denote proper defeaters and a
double-pointed arrow ( oo // ) connects blocking
defeaters. In figure 1, a simple framework is shown.
Argument C is a subargument of A. Argument B is a
proper defeater of C and D is a blocking defeater of
B and viceversa.
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Figure 1: Defeat graph
3 ARGUMENTATION SEMANTICS
Well known semantics for abstract argumentation
frameworks are based on defeat relations, usually
called attack relations [5, 15, 3]. These formalisms
assume the existence of a binary relation of attack
(not necessarily symmetric) defined over the set of all
possible arguments, such that if (A,B) are in the at-
tack relation then in order to accept B it is necessary
to find out if A is accepted or not, but not the other
way around. The acceptance relation should be de-
rived from a conflict relation between arguments and
a suitable comparison criterion, and that criterion usu-
ally remains unspecified in the abstract system. This
remark on the attack relation is seldom made.
We formalize these concepts using a preference re-
lation to derive defeat relations. However, as stated in
our framework, the comparison method used to eval-
uate pairs of arguments may not always establish a
preference on conflicting arguments, and that charac-
teristic deserves more attention. In fact, a method
which is able to always decide preference between
any pair of arguments in the system is desirable albeit
not very realistic. Clearly, in many cases there will
be incomparable arguments [15]. Therefore, another
special type of defeat must be taken into account: the
one derived when no preference can be established
between conflictive arguments.
It is our contention that an extended semantics for
argumentation will be useful. This semantics will be
based on the two defining characteristics of an argu-
mentation system: the conflict relation between argu-
ments and the comparison criterion used to evaluate
such arguments.
The notion of conflict between two arguments A
and B establishes that these arguments cannot be ac-
cepted together. Therefore, any set of accepted argu-
ments could not contain arguments in conflict. A set
of arguments of this kind is said to be coherent.
Arguments can be classified as accepted arguments
or non-accepted or rejected arguments according to
their context in the framework. Given a set of ar-
guments S, two kinds of arguments are easily iden-
tified as accepted arguments: first, those arguments
not involved in any conflict in S; second, those argu-
ments actually involved in a conflict, but preferred to
the arguments that are in conflict with them, accord-
ing to function R. Both kinds of special arguments
are called defeater free arguments. Defeater-free ar-
guments must be accepted, since no (preferred) con-
tradictory information is provided in the framework.
Note that this classification is relative to the set in
which the argument is included.
As noted before, the semantics of a conflict relation
states that when an argument A is accepted, any argu-
ment in Conf (A) should be rejected. The following
definition captures a subset of arguments that should
be rejected in the framework. They are called sup-
pressed arguments.
Definition 3 Let S be a set of arguments in
〈Args,C,R〉. An argument A ∈ S is said to be sup-
pressed in S if one of the following cases hold: (a)
there is a defeater-free argument B in S such that B
is a proper defeater of A, or (b) there is a blocking
defeater B of A, and there is no other argument C
(C 6= A) in S such that C is a defeater of B.
Given a set S of arguments it is as easy to identify
obviously suppressed arguments as it is to identify in-
evitably accepted ones. The function Υ : 2Args −→
2Args characterizes the set of arguments not directly
suppressed in a given set, and it is defined as
Υ(S) = {A : A ∈ S and A is not suppressed in S}
The least fixpoint of this function, is denoted Υω.
By definition, no argument is suppressed in Υω.
Therefore, if Υω is a coherent set, then any argument
in Υω is an accepted argument. The set of this argu-
ments in Υω is denoted Υω+.
However, the set Υω may still not be a coherent
set. This is related to the presence of some special
arguments involved in a fallacy, as discussed in the
next section.
4 CONTROVERSIAL SITUATIONS AND
FALLACIES
It is possible that the repeated application of operator
Υ will not lead to a coherent set, as shown in [4]. In
that case, some controversial situations may be found
in the argumentation framework. It can be proved that
if Υω is not a coherent set of arguments, then there ex-
ists a cycle of defeaters. This cycle is called a fallacy,
and the comparison criterion plays a very important
role in its existence.
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Figure 2: Controversial situation
Definition 4 An argumentation framework Φ is said
to contain a fallacy if Υω is not a coherent set of ar-
guments.
The presence of fallacies is related to the lack of
decision in the preference function, under some com-
mon sense conditions [15, 4]. Several preference re-
lations between arguments are used in different argu-
mentation systems. Most of them are based on prop-
erties observed on the structure of arguments. It has
been noted that preference relations should be a total
or partial pre-order on the set of arguments.
The most important premise in defeasible argu-
mentation is that an argument must be accepted only
when none of its defeaters are. However, no fallacious
argument can exhibit this property, because at least
one of its defeaters is also a fallacious argument 2.
Therefore, any argument of this kind should not be
accepted. In Figure 2 a simple argumentation frame-
work is depicted, where five arguments are shown in-
teracting with each other. Note that, in this frame-
work, Υω = Υ0, because no defeater-free arguments
are present and there is a cycle of blocking defeaters,
and condition 2 from definition 3 is therefore not sat-
isfied. The progressive elimination of suppressed ar-
guments modeled by Υ leads to a non-coherent set.
Thus, we have Υω+ = ∅. Note that not every argu-
ment in Υω is a fallacious argument: arguments D
and E are not involved in the fallacy. However, they
are not included in Υω+ because both of them are di-
rectly or indirectly related to fallacious arguments.
The main structure analized in this research line is
the defeat path.
2Because any non-fallacious defeater has been previously sup-
pressed.
Definition 5 (Defeat path) A defeat path λ of an ar-
gumentation framework 〈Args,v,C,R〉 is a finite
sequence of arguments [A1, A2, . . . , An] such that ar-
gument Ai+1 is a defeater of argument Ai for any
0 < i < n. The number of arguments in the path is
denoted |λ|. A defeat path for A is any defeat path
starting with A [A,D1,D2, . . . ,Dn].
A defeat path is a sequence of defeating arguments.
The length of the defeat path is important for accep-
tance purposes, because an argument A defeated by
an argumentBmay be reinstated by another argument
C. In this case, it is said that argument C defends A
against B. Note that three arguments are involved in
a defense situation: the attacked, the attacker and the
defender.
If the length of a defeat path for argument A is odd,
then the last argument in the sequence is playing a
supporting or defender role. If the length is even, then
the last argument is playing an interfering or attacker
role [13, 6].
The notion of defeat path is very simple and only
requires that any argument in the sequence must de-
feat the previous one. Under this unique constraint,
which is the basis of argumentation processes, it is
possible to obtain some controversial structures, when
pieces of information are reinserted in the sequence
[4]. The initial idea of restricting the inclusion of ar-
guments previously considered in the sequence is not
enough. Some well-formed structure must be devised.
In the next section we explore these ideas.
5 PROGRESSIVE DEFEAT PATHS
Conflict relations are propagated through superargu-
ments: if A and B are in conflict, then A+ and B are
also conflictive arguments. On the other hand, when-
ever two arguments are in conflict, it is always possi-
ble to identify conflictive subarguments. This notion
can be extended to defeat relations. Let A and B be
two arguments such that B is a defeater of A. Then
both arguments are in conflict and A 6 B. There
may exist a non-trivial subargument Ai < A such
that (B,Ai) ∈ C. It is clear, as R is monotonic, that
R(B,Ai) 6= {Ai}, and therefore B is also a defeater
of Ai. Thus, for any pair of conflictive arguments
(A,B) there is always a pair of conflictive arguments
(C,D) where C v A and D v B. This underlying
cause of a conflict relation between two arguments
due to the inheritance property is called core conflict.
This leads to the notion of disputed subargument.
Definition 6 (Disputed subargument) Let A and B
be two arguments such that B is a defeater of A. A
subargument Ai v A is said to be a disputed subar-
gument of A with respect to B if Ai is a core conflict
of A and B.
The notion of disputed subargument is very impor-
tant in the construction of defeat paths in dialectical
processes. Suppose argument B is a defeater of ar-
gument A. It is possible to construct a defeat path
λ = [A,B]. If there is a defeater of B, say C, then
[A,B,C] is also a defeat path. However, C should
not be a disputed argument of A with respect to B,
as circularity is introduced in the path. Even more, C
should not be an argument that includes that disputed
argument, because that path can always be extended
by adding B again. It is possible to define a defeat
domain, a set of valid arguments to add to a defeath
path, discarding controversial arguments. The func-
tion Dk(λ) [4] denotes the set of arguments that can
be used to extend the defeat path λ at stage k, i. e.,
to defeat the argument Ak. Choosing an argument
from Dk(λ) avoids the introduction of previous dis-
puted arguments in the sequence. It is important to
remark that if an argument including a previous dis-
puted subargument is reintroduced in the defeat path,
it is always possible to reintroduce its original de-
feater. Therefore, in order to avoid controversial sit-
uations, any argument Ai of a defeat path λ should
be in Di−1(λ). Selecting an argument outside this
set implies the repetition of previously disputed infor-
mation. Those defeat paths in which Ai ∈ Di−1(λ)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The following definition charac-
terizes well structured sequences of arguments, called
progressive defeat paths. Progressive defeat paths are
free of circular situations and guarantees progressive
argumentation, as desired on every dialectical pro-
cess. One of the important consequences of this for-
malizacion is that it is possible to include a subargu-
ment of previous arguments in the sequence, as long
as it is not a disputed subargument. This is allowed in
abstract argumentation, as subarguments not involved
in any conflict can always participate several times in
any argumentation line.
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